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''WAR IS THE SPOET AND GAME OF KINaS.' 



"Our true glory, our growth, our freedom consists not in conquest, subject 
colonies, or militarism, but in the paths of liberty, industry, and peace." 



i ARMY APPROPRIATION BILL— OUR RELATIONS WITH 
:, ' ! .- THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. 



\ 



SPEECH 



OF 



MM. ADOLPH MEYER, 



OF LOUISIANA, 



/ \ 



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 



M0:N^DAY, march 26, 1900. 



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TV^ ASHiisrGJ-'rON . 

1900. 







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p 

Cong. Record 0-f**j 
10 Ja.' 01 






SPEECH 

OP J 

HOI^. ADOLPH MEYER, 

OF LOUISIANA, 



The House being in Committee of the "Whole on the state of the Union 
and having under consideration the bill (H. R. 8583) making appropriation 
for the support of the Regular and Volunteer Army for the fiscal year end- 
ing June 30, 1901— 

Mr. MEYER of Louisiana said: 

Mr. Speaker: I have no opposition to make to the features of 
the bill now before the House. I recognize that we have an army 
in the field, an army confronted with serious and grave dangers, ' 
and I would not say a word in antagonism to any reasonable plan 
or proposal to maintain that army until it has accomplished its 
work. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I will not address myself to the 
question of the appropriations embraced in the present bill, but 
to a question which may well be Regarded as germane to it— our 
relations to and with the Philippine Islands and the course we 
should pursue concerning them. 

I. WAB IS THE SPORT AND GAME OF KINGS. 

Mr. Speaker, the war that has been going on in the Philippine 
Islands and the questions of public policy growing out of this war 
constitute grave and momentous issues for the American people, 
issues that may affect our destinies for all time to come. The 
American people come of a warlike stock, but they are not a war- 
loving people. The deplorable civil war between the States ended 
over thirty years ago. The war with Spain closed after a very 
brief struggle in the triumph of our arms. Peace jubilees fol- 
lowed at once all over the land. The good sense of the American 
people has steadily recognized peace as an inestimable blessing, 
and war, even when necessary, they regard as a great calamity. 
War is the sport and game of kings. Nobles and kings may well 
delight in war. They reap the honors and rewards. The heroism 
of the private soldiers all go to enhance the glory of monarch, 
nobles, and officers. The gallant deeds of the privates are known 
only to a few surviving comrades. The sacrifices and sufferings 
of the war, the grievous taxes paid, the impoverishment of the 
family, the loss to the wife and children of their sustaining prop 
and protector, the struggles of the maimed and crippled veteran 
to eke out a support, the burden of debt and taxation fastened on 
labor for generations to come— what has the monarch, the noble, 
or the rich contractor to do with all this? How can they sym- 
pathize with all these sufferings and hardships — they who have 
reaped only riches and fame from this widespread human misery? 

If this be true in the case of the victors, how much worse is the 
case of the vanquished? The poor man, the peasant, the farraer, 
if he survives the war it is probably to find a desolated habitation, 
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perhaps only a blackened chimney to remind him of a once happy 
home, a beggared family, and, it may be, wrongs to his helpless 
family of which I dare not speak. If to his own fury and passions 
the conqueror adds the specious plea that he is the chosen mstru- 
ment of Grod's wrath to punish some alleged crime of another 
nation or people, or that it is his duty to carry civilization and 
religion to distant lands by the military arm, then you may expect 
to witness a double installment of man's malice. If you doubt 
this, read the history of the so-called religious wars of Europe 
and Asia and the story of Roman and British conquests. Recall 
the names of Verres and the Roman proconsuls, of Clive and 
Hastings, Pizarro and Cortez, and some others of our own day 
and generation who have plundered, scourged, and oppressed a 
subject population. [Applause.] 

II. NO DISHONOR IN TREATING WITH ALLEGED REBELS. 

Our Revolutionary war of 1776 was a righteous war, one of self- 
defense, and for the right to govern ourselves. At the outset our 
petitions for peace and justice were "spurned from the foot of 
the throne." We were told that "rebels" in arms could not be 
treated with: that we must lay down our arms and submit. The 
terrible contest went on and on with varying fortunes, until 
finally the King of England condescended to treat with us. Peace 
and independence were the result. Sir. there is no dishonor, there 
can be none, in negotiating with alleged rebels or insurgents. If 
there were such dishonor, then England might have held out in- 
definitely. We have oui'selves often made treaties of peace with In- 
dian tribes who had defied our authority. The brave and the strong 
can always afford to be generous. The story of that period sup- 
plies another moral. France had helped us greatly. At the close 
we were exhausted, almost helpless, but she asked no pecuniary 
reward and no surrender of any territory as compensation for her 
powerful succor, and still less did she dream of selling out her 
allies, the American colonies, to any country for a sum of money, 
or of buying England's title to our shores. She quitted the fight 
clean-handed, with her honor unstained. No Frenchman need 
blush for that page of history. 

III. POWER TO MAKE WAR RESTS WITH CONGRESS. 

The American statesmen of that day had pondered well the les- 
sons of history. They had seen kings make war again and again 
regardless of the people's wishes. They, therefore, refused to 
trust the President with the war-making power. They would not 
trust it to the Senate, high as that body was to be, and then 
deemed most unlikely to be influenced by patronage. They would 
not trust the power of making war even to the President and 
Senate combined. I am aware, sir, that there are some politicians 
of our day who claim that the President and Senate combined can 
by a treaty make a war and can even empower Congress to legis- 
late in United States territory outside of the Federal Constitution; 
but this is not the doctrine of the good and great men who created 
our form of government. They, indeed, allowed the President 
and the Senate to make peace by the form of a treaty; but this 
power to make war, so solemn, so awful in its responsibilities, 
they would confide only to Congress. Therefore, in order to make 
war, it is necessary under our Constitution to have the concur- 
rence of the people's immediate representatives, chosen every two 
years, and of the Senate, a body chosen by the State legislatures 

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and presumed to be more free from popular passion and excite- 
ment. Yet you have additional restraints upon the making war. 
If the President does not approve the act declaring war. two- 
thirds of each branch of Congress are necessary in order to over- 
rule him and make it his duty to draw the sword. Sometimes a 
President is more conservative than Congress. 

These limitations upon the war-making power are not mere 
empty forms. They concern the rights, the happiness, and the 
liberties of the people, to whom all public officials are not masters, 
but servants. Ours is or ought to be a government of pu blic opin- 
ion. In order to ascertain that opinion, these forms were devised 
by statesmen compared with whom those of the present day fall 
very far short, 

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL FORMS OBSERVED IN WAR WITH SPAIN. 

In the war with Spain these constitutional forms were observed. 
The President did not desire war. He did not undertake to make 
war. It is only justice to him to say that he strove to avert war 
by making demands which he thought Spain would concede. 
Finally, he reported the whole facts of the situation to Congress, 
making no specific recommendation, and devolving upon that 
body the responsibility of making the dread decision of war or 
peace. Congress acted promptly. Congress demanded that Spain 
should relinquish her authority in Cuba, and directed the Presi- 
dent to employ, if necessary, the land and naval forces of the United 
States in order to carry the resolution into effect. 

It was foreseen that this action would involve a war for the lib- 
eration of Cuba. In view of this contingency. Congress was care- 
ful to embrace in the joint resolution a declaration of our motives 
and purposes in this armed intervention. This was done in the 
most explicit language. Repelling the idea of some persons that 
our motive was merely greed for new territory, Congress posi- 
tively disclaimed any purpose to exercise dominion over the island 
of Cuba except for its pacification, and pledged the republic when 
that pacification should be accomplished to leave the government 
of the island to its ovm people. Nothing was said of the other 
possessions of Spain. Our country knew nothing of the Philip- 
pine Islands and cared nothing about the struggles and disorders 
in that remote locality. There was no struggle at all in Puerto 
Rico as in Cuba— no revolt, no reports of discontent with Spanish 
rule. Now, it could not be supposed that while rejecting the rich 
and beautiful island of Cuba, in order to avouch the purity of our 
noble endeavor for its freedom, we should make any reservations, 
whether mental or verbal, that we would appropriate other col- 
onies of Spain as compensation for a war alleged to be begun solely 
for the cause of humanity and civilization. It seems to me that 
the declaration of disinterestedness asserted in respect to Cuba 
ought to have been regarded as an expression of the policy of the 
two Houses of Congress and of the American people in relation to 
the whole war and its incidents. The war was not to be waged 
for money or territory, but for honor, for humanity, for civiliza- 
tion, and, as was well said by an eminent Senator, to " abate a 
nuisance."' [Applause.! 

War followed the President's signature on the 20th of April, 1898, 
to these pregnant resolves of Congress. As soon as Spain learned 
of the President's signature to the joint resolution requiring her 
to withdraw from Cuba, she preceded to terminat-^ all diplomatic 
relations with the United States. She notified Mr. Woodford, our 



6 

minister at Madrid, that the Spanish Government regarded this 
joint resolution as " equivalent to an evident declaration of war." 
This was done on April 21, 1898. On the following day, April 
22, the President declared a blockade of certain Cuban ports, 
but he based this act and also his proclamation calling for vol- 
unteers upon the joint resolution by Congress of April 20 and 
upon an act of Congress approved April 22, 1898. It was felt, 
however, by all persons that as war was to ensue it ought to be 
preceded by an act of Congress. Following the spirit and text of 
the Constitution, the President on April 25, 1898, after reciting 
the precise situation of affairs, recommended to Congress the 
adoption of a resolution declaring that a state of war exists be- 
tween the United States and the Kingdom of Spain. Congress 
acted immediately on his suggestion, and that very day the Pres- 
ident signed the resolution declaring war. Here was the author- 
ity for the war with Spain, in these two acts or resolutions of 
Congress dated the 20th and 25th of April, respectively, both passed 
pursuant to the Constitution. It was not a Presidential war or 
an act of usurpation, but a war made by the full authority of the 
American Congress. 

1 have been careful in reciting the various steps by which we 
went to war with Spain, because I wish you to compare them with 
the history of our present war in the Philippine Islands. Every 
step in making the war with Spain was in perfect accordance 
with constitutional forms. Congress declared war. Congress de- 
fined the causes and purposes of the war. These laws are in- 
scribed on our statute book. The war thus constitutionally de- 
clared was supported by the American people regardless of party. 
The valor of our troops and sailors was worthy of our traditions 
as a martial people and was crowned with speedy and brilliant 
success. [Applause.] 

But consider the war now being waged against the people of the 
Philippines. Was that war declared by Congress? Everyone 
knows the contrary to be the truth. Were its causes and pur- 
poses defined by Congress? Never! The legislative body could 
easily have been convened last spring. Under our Constitution, 
Congress can not meet in special session without a call of the 
President, but that act of assemblage by Congress would be a less 
stretch of power than the initiation of war or hostilities without 
the authority of Congress. 

V. CONGRESS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSULTED. 

Ttie President could have summoned Congress to meet in March, 
1899, to deal with all questions growing out of the Spanish war, 
but he would not do so; and thus this war in the Philippines, be- 
gun irregularly, has gone on day by day, with its catalogue of suf- 
fering and bloodshed, assuming as it progressed larger and larger 
proportions, until the Administration was obliged to employ 
65,000 armed men in a war against a people on the opposite side 
of the globe! And all this is done without formally consulting- 
Congress or the American people! I ask you, is this consistent 
with the American Constitution? Does it not violate that sacred 
instrument in one of its most vital provisions— the regulation of 
the great war-making power? I a mit that when Congress is not 
in session we may be assailed and our rights invaded by a for- 
eign government, and that in such cases the President is bound 
to protect American interests and, if necessary, to employ force 
for this purpose; but it is equally his duty in grave and serious 
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cases to convene Congress at once in extraordinary session to pass 
on the question of war and peace. His functions in such emer- 
gencies are defensive. It is for Congress only to convert defensive 
hostilities into war. In a monarchical government the sovereign 
may decline to summon the national legislature to his aid. He 
may deem himself wise and great enough to take into his own 
hands the question of war and peace. But our Government is not 
a monarchy. It is a republic; and we must reason strictly on 
that basis if we desire to preserve our birthright of freedom. 

It may be said, however, that Congress was in session on the 
4th of February, 1899, when hostilities began in the Philippines. 
This collision was a very serious event — an armed conflict with a 
people who but a short time before were as friendly to Americans 
as they had been hostile to Spain, and who had waged a noble 
battle for freedom which all of us had applauded. If, when this 
sad event occurred, the policy of the Government was to refuse 
all peace negotiation and to conquer by the sword the nine or ten 
millions of jpeople residing in these islands, it was unquestionably 
the duty of the President to submit the facts to Congress and an- 
nounce his plans for their consideration and decision. This is 
substantially what he so wisely did in respect to Cuba. 

If he considered that, with only one short month of the session 
remaining and the great annual appropriation bills still not framed 
into laws, the Fiftj^-fifth Congress would not have the time re- 
quired for the proper consideration of these great and new ques- 
tions, it was easy for him to summon the Fifty-sixth Congress. 
That Congress had been chosen and could have been assembled in 
two weeks or even less time. In both bodies of that Congress there 
was a majority of the President's party friends. Surely it will 
not be said that in such a body as that there could not be found 
the wisdom to grapple with the problem. Remember that the 
war with Spain was closed entirely in 1898. Spain had submitted 
to our demands. The treaty of peace with her was ratified by the 
United States Senate early in February, 1899, and very soon after- 
wards by the Spanish Government. Obviously the time had now 
come for Congress to adjust all the questions growing out of the 
Spanish war — the disposition of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and, more par- 
ticularly, the Philippines— when prompt action by Congress might 
stay the further effusion of blood. In a public address, delivered 
at Boston the 16th of February last, the President declared that the 
final disposition of the Philippines belonged to Congress. By fail- 
ing to summon Congress together he made himself the actual 
master of the situation. 

Look at the precedents. Mr. Lincoln called Congress together 
in 1N61. When in Maj^, 1846, hostilities occurred on the Rio 
Grande between our forces and those of Mexico, President Polk 
laid the facts before Congress immediately and recommended the 
policy which Congress then adopted. Mr. Madison asked the con- 
sent of Congress before making war against Great Britain in 1812, 
although acts of hostility had previously occurred, and our flag 
had been fired upon. The" examples of Presidents so distinguished 
ought to govern us, even if we had no written Constitution and 
were groping in the dark for the path of duty. If the Executive 
may conduct a foreign war for nine or ten months without the 
authority or direction of Congress, why may he not, on the plea 
of necessity or emergency, impose new taxes and customs duties, 
or perform any other function expressly assigned to Congress by 
the Federal Constitution? [Applause.] 
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8 

VI. EVENTS PRECEDING HOSTILITIES. 

Mr. Speaker, it is not my purpose to detain the House by recit- 
ing at length the history of events in the Philippines prior to the 
collision which in February last year led to the present unhappy 
conflict. That history in all important respects is reported in 
Senate Document No. 62 of the third session of the Fifty-fifth 
Congress. This document and the dispatches to the press tell the 
story of a general revolt against Spain in the island of Luzon, and 
a general occupation of the country by the insurgents prior to 
Dewey's destruction of the Spanish fleet on May 1, 1898. That 
document informs us how the insurgents in large numbers were 
encamped near Manila and threatening that city. Before Dewey 
sailed from the coast of Asia, overtures had been made by the 
United States officials at Singapore and Hongkong for the coopera- 
tion of Aguinaldo in the fight against Spanish power. 

They arranged for an interview between Commodore Dewey 
and Aguinaldo before Dewey sailed. Dewey telegraphed in reply, 
"Tell Aguinaldo to come at once." It was pursuant to these 
arrangements for cooperation and alliance with the Americans 
that Aguinaldo went to Manila. Arriving there soon after Com- 
modore Dewey's victory of May 1, 1898, he put himself in cooper- 
ation with Dewey and received arms and other aid from him. 
He put himself at the head of the insurgent forces and movement. 
He armed them largely with his own means, and at a time when 
the Americans had no land forces there he had driven the Spanish 
forces into Manila and closely invested the city on the land side, 
cutting off their supplies of food and water supply and harass- 
ing them with constant attacks. He was a friend and an ally— a 
valuable ally to the United States forces, for it was a good while 
before enough of our troops arrived at Manila to render his fur- 
ther cooperation unnecessary. All this time the relations of the 
United States officers and of the Filipinos were most friendly. It 
was at this time— the 29th of August, 1898— that Commodore 
Dewey wrote the Navy Department: 

In a telegram sent to the Department on June 33 I expressed the opinion 
that these people are far superior in their intelligence and are more capable 
of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both 
races. Further intercourse with them has confirmed me in this opinion. 

These favorable opinions of the Filipinos are confirmed by the 
recorded testimony of President Schurman, Professor Worcester, 
Mr. John Barrett, Gen. Charles A. Whitten, Gen. Charles King, 
and a number of eminent Americans familiar with the islands and 
their inhabitants. 

On June 12, 1898, the Filipinos proceeded to hold a national 
council and to form a provisional government. They were then 
investing Manila on the land side. They had probably more men 
in arms than the colonies had at any one time from 1775 to 1783 in 
the struggle with Great Britain. A few days later, on June 23, 
Dewey telegraphed that this people were more capable of self-gov- 
ernment than the Cubans. Is not this dispatch a proof that he 
was then in sympathy with their movement for self-government 
and independence? He certainly expressed no disapproval of the 
steps they were taking, nor did any other Army officer or official 
then representing the United States Government. 

The Filipino government was formally proclaimed on the 23d 
June, 1898. A congress was provided for, which was to assemble 
at Malolos, in Luzon, about September 20, 1898. This was an in- 
dependent governraent. Its formation was matter of world-wide 
notoriety. Its existence was known in Washington City almost 
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as well as at Manila, Yet no protest or objection was made against 
it by our Government or any of our officers. Generals Anderson 
and Merritt did not say a word against it. If there was any pur- 
pose on the part of our officials to hold on to these islands, or even 
to Luzon, would it not have been the fair thing to notify these 
people that they were going too far? Was it not natural and 
rea;Sonable for them to assume that they would be allowed by us 
to indulge their ardent aspiration for a government of their own 
choice? How could they look upon us as mere vulgar conquerors 
and imitators of the Spaniards? They had a highly educated class 
among them who were probably familiar with our public declara- 
tion of disinterestedness in respect to Cuba and who concluded 
that we would pursue a like policy in regard to them. They had 
indeed done far more to achieve their independence than the Cu- 
bans had done. They held then all of Luzon save a few square 
miles containing the city of Manila. All their manifestoes and 
public declarations evinced a profound respect and admiration of 
the American Government and people. 

It is somewhat difficult to fix the precise time when the scheme 
of annexing the Philippine Islands was resolved upon. At the 
very outset the British press sought to commit us to the reten- 
tion of the Philippines and to the imperial policy. It has been 
asserted that British diplomacy was exerted to the same end, 
possilily with a view to a broader and more far-reaching alliance 
by which her interests were to be promoted and guarded. All 
this ran counter to the wise counsels of Washington and Jeffer- 
son. If the President agreed with this policy hedid not declare 
it to Congress when it met in December. 1898. In his annual 
message, dated December 5, 1898, he said that he — 

would not discuss at that time the government or the future of the new 
possessions which will come to us as the result of the war with Spain. Such 
discussion will be appropriate after the treaty of peace shall be ratified. 

The spirit of this remark was wise and in conformity to the 
genius of our institutions. [Applause.] 

It is true that as early as October 31, 1898, our commission- 
ers at Paris demanded of Spain the cession of these islands, but 
the fact was not officially made known to Congress itntil by the 
President's message to the Senate of January 4, 1899. The terms 
of the treaty were, however, generally understood, prior to this, 
to include the cession of the Philippine Islands by Spain for the 
sum of $20,000,000, and this fact, coupled with some of the Presi- 
dent's public addresses, was well calculated to alarm and dis- 
quiet the Filipino people. Thus the relations of the two parties, 
in Luzon, though not hostile, became much strained, not to say 
unfriendly. But no formal issue had been made. The President 
was not yet formally committed to annexation. The treaty itself 
had not been ratified. The Senate might perhaps amend it, or, if 
the Senate preferred to ratify it as it stood rather than run the 
risk of prolonging a costly war with an unsettled state of affairs 
following, the President might still turn over to Congress the 
momentous question of settling the destinies of the nine or ten 
millions of people living in these islands. It was an ea.sy matter 
to make the payment of the twenty millions a basis for the native 
government surrendering to us such naval station or stations as we 
might desire and reimburse us the twenty millions as their reve- 
nues might permit. This sum was a small amount compared 
with what we had expended in order to free Cuba from Spanish 
rule. 

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10 

The Filipinos would probably have been only too happy to make 
such arrangements with us and maintain their selt'-government 
under an American protectorate. These people probably reasoned 
on these lines of thought, for all during the month of January, 
1899, they maintained a diplomatic representative at Washington 
City. He was not received, though he represented a people who 
had been our allies during the war with Spain. I mean allies in 
fact and in friendly feeling and with a cordial understanding. 

VII. THE FATAL COLLISION. 

I come now to the unfortunate collision which ensued between 
the American troops and the Filipinos on February 4, 1899. It 
was an affair of outposts. There is much dispute as to who were 
the aggressors, into which question I do not care to enter. But 
there are some historical facts pertinent to this event which are 
undisputed. The treaty of peace with Spain ceding us the Philip- 
pines, to which she had only s, technical and a paper title, without 
any actual possession whatever, was signed on December 10, 1898, 
at Paris. On December 21, 1898— that is to say, before the treaty 
was communicated to the United States Senate — the President 
issued positive instructions to the Secretary of War to be pro- 
mulgated in the Philippines. He stated therein that the destruc- 
tion of the Spanish fleet, followed by the capture of Manila, had 
practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands; that 
Spain had ceded these islands to the United States, and that under 
the rights of sovereignty thus acquired the "actual occupation 
and administration of the entire group of the Philippine Islands " 
had become '"immediately necessary,"' and that "the military 
government previously maintained by the United States in the 
city, harbor, and bay of Manila was to be extended with all possi- 
ble dispatch to the whole of the ceded territory." 

Now, at this very time the military lines and occupation of the 
Filipinos covered nearly the whole of the island of Luzon — all of it, 
indeed, save Manila and a very few square miles near by, which 
constituted hardly a hundredth part of the whole island. The Fili- 
pino government had been in actual operation over six months, 
with its capitol located at the city of Malolos, in Luzon, and gov- 
erning the island, with the full consent of the United States 
authority. The language of the proclamation undoubtedly meant 
that these people were to give up their own government, disband 
their armies, and submit implicitly to the United States military 
forces of which General Otis was the head. If they should not at 
once and unanimously give up their government and disband all 
their armies, conflict was inevitable. In case of resistance " firm- 
ness " and " severity " were to be employed. Such language can 
have but one meaning. The Filipinos, or many of them, prob- 
ably construed it to mean war. Certainly such an interpretation 
on their part was very natural. 

It deserves to be specially noted that this document was not 
sent to the United States Senate until the 4th of January, 1899. 
It was then sent in as a confidential document or with confiden- 
tial papers. It was promulgated in Manila on the same day it 
went to the United States Senate. 

Would it not have been a wiser course, instead of this order 
requiring "immediate" action by our army in Luzon, for the 
Executive to maintain the status quoin the islands, holding on to 
Manila and any other point then in our actual possession, and 
leaving to the Filipinos, our late allies, the temporary occupation 
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11 

of the remainder of the island, which by their heroism and sacri- 
fices they had wrested from Spain? This state of things had ex- 
isted for over six months with peace and good will. Surely it could 
well be suffered to continue at least until the Senate should have 
acted on the treaty and until Congress should make some decision 
as to the future of these islands, as was apparently contemplated 
by the President in his annual message to Congress. What pub:ic 
interest would have suffered by a course of patience and concilia- 
tion? 

With this proclamation, so well calculated to alarm and irritate 
this people who had indulged a fond dream of independence, it is 
ind-ed strange that the Filipino leaders should have been able to 
restrain their followers as long as they did. Even after the col- 
lision of February 4, 1899, there is ground for the belief that the 
leaders would have been very glad to make a pacific arrangement, 
but there was no disposition to accept anything but their unqual- 
ified submission. I shall not recite the history of the war. Our 
armies were reenforced to the number of 65,000 men. Our Navy 
gallantly cooperated. The American soldiers showed, as all ex- 
pected, that they knew how to fight for their flag. The Filipinos 
have shown that they also know how to make sacrifices and. if 
need be, to die for their independence. Both sides have suffered 
greatly. 

The island of Luzon has been overrun with the usual waste and 
havoc, and the Filipino; are now split up into small bands. Re- 
sistance is not yet extinguished, but it may be extinguished. On 
the other hand, some of our best military men say that the war 
will go on indefinitely. The manner in which ten or fifteen 
thousand insurgents in Cuba kept up a contest with Spain and 
her army of 200.000 men for ten or more years shows the great 
difficulty to be expected in suppressing resistance in a tropical 
country, with jungles, morasses, swamps, and mountains for the 
natives to retreat to and make a stand. It is utterly vain now to 
attempt a prophecy about the military situation. I should be 
glad if this suffering and misery could be brovight to a close, but 
I fear the end is not yet near at hand. 

Much as I deplore the waste and havoc of war, the loss of valu- 
able lives, the burden of grievous taxation and increased public 
debt, there are, to my mind, other evils which may come to us from 
this unfortunate situation. We are confronted with the serious 
question whether we are to leave these people to their own gov- 
ernment or whether we are to rule them as subjects. It is not 
now proposed hj anybody to admit these people to our citizenship 
or to allow them to become at any time a governing power in our 
confederated Republic. No, sir. The proposition is to treat them 
as subjects, perhaps by the military arm. perhaps by the form or 
pretense of a civil government, the latter to be reenforced by the 
sword if necessary. How many troops are to be used for our per- 
manent army of occupation we are not told: nor the cost, nor how 
lono' this state of things is to last. But it is obvious that the leaders 
of the Republican party are fully committed to the plan of hold- 
ing these islands by the strong hand of power at any and ail cost 
of blood and treasure. They even go so far as to assert that Con- 
gress has a right to legislate for these islands outside of the Con- 
stitution. In their creed our noble Constitution is a movable 
feast, and not the daily bread by which the spirit of liberty is to 
be fed. Yet many of those who now uphold this strange doctrine 
4300 



13 

not long ago stood up in this very Hall and swore before God to 
support and obey the Constitution of the United States. 

VIII. THE PLEA or A LARGER TRADE WITH THE ORIENT. 

The pleas upon which we are to adopt this new policy of con- 
quest and empire are utterly devoid of truth and logic. Such 
especially is the claim that owv trade with the Orient will be 
largely enhanced and become exceedingly profitable. It is said 
that we must have new markets and that the trade of these islands 
is but a stepping-stone to that of China. It is over 600 miles from 
Manila to Hongkong, and it is hard to see any connection between 
the trade with Manila and that with China, Vessels going to 
China do not touch at Manila; it is far out of the way. I admit, 
I recognize the great importance of our present trade with China. 
I admit and can easily foresee that if our rights and interests are 
properly cared for our prospective trade with China may swell 
to grand proportions, and perhaps in time equal or surpass our 
present trade with Europe. Why do I say this? Because China 
is inhabited by four or five hundred millions of an industrious, 
energetic race, who live in a temperate climate like our own and 
who are just beginning to adopt the industrial arts by which a 
people become rich and powerful. They are keen traders and 
industrious artisans. 

At present the body of the population live on very scanty wages; 
they produce very little per capita. Consequently they have not 
a great deal at present to offer in exchange, and all commerce 
rests on an exchange of surplus products. Their production will 
increase rapidly — perhaps I may say dangerously — and with the 
surplus products to export they will be able and willing to import. 
But, sir. I am remii)decl that it is already announced that the State 
Department has concluded arrangements with foreign powers by 
virtiie of which if they hold or acquire territory in China, or have 
what is called "spheres of influence" our wares and merchan- 
dise are to suffer no prejudice, but are to be admitted freely into 
China, as heretofore. I fear very much that such understanding 
may have very little practical value when the crisis arises. 

If, however, 1 am mistaken in this and our future commerce is 
well guarded, then we may dismiss the Philippines as a factor in 
the China trade. If, however, as may well turn out. our trade in 
and with China is to be discriminated against by rapacious Eu- 
ropean powers who are now actively grabbing Chinese territory, 
then our power to protest and repel such injustice and injury to 
our trade will not be augmented by our being loaded up with a 
rebellious set of colonies in the Philippines, which we are to watch, 
guard, and keep in order. The energies, the money, the military 
and naval power already expended in the conquest of the Philip- 
pines might very well be reserved for employment in the great 
and important i^roblem now looming up before us, namely: Are 
we to have the trade with China to which we are fairly entitled 
by reason of our varied products, the skill and energj- of our peo- 
ple, and our favorable position on the Pacific Ocean? Does it not 
look, sir, as if we were sacrificing substance for shadow in our 
frantic struggles to absorb the Philippines? [Applause.] 

IX. VALUE OF THE PHILIPPINES' TRADE. 

The trade with the Philippines— how much is it worth? How 
much can it be worth to us as compared with our trade in other 
directions? Well, you will not, under a free-trade or " open door " 
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policy, have any special advantages. The European nations, by 
virtue of the Suez Canal, are nearer to the Philippines than we are 
or will be until perhaps a canal is built across the Isthmus. But as- 
sume that after annexing the Philippines we impose a tariff suffi- 
cient to give us the control of the whole import trade. It would 
give us verj' little. According to the last returns, when the island 
of Luzon was at its best, the total foreign trade was only about 
$30,000,000, and our profit on it would be a mere bagatelle com- 
pared with the cost of ownership — the Army and Navy needed to 
suppress revolts and protect our new possessions. It may be said 
that this small trade of the islands, with nine or ten millions of 
people, was because everything was blighted or repressed by 
Spanish rule. 

There may be something in this point, but I read that under 
Spanish rule Cuba was once a very rich island and had a very 
valuable trade. I beg you to remember that the great body of 
the people of the Philippines have very few wants. They are 
very near the equatorial line; the climate is hot. In such cli- 
mates there is little demand for animal food. A little rice and 
bread goes a long way. Warm clothing is not required, nor much 
clothing of any kind. The body of the people live in very cheap 
habitations. They have very few wants. They can live com- 
fortably and have all the necessaries of life on 5 to 10 cents per 
day. All tropical experiences and reports go to show that under 
such conditions the inferior races — the African, Indian, and Malay 
races— will network any more than is absolutely necessary to make 
a bare support. They will produce no surplus for export. They 
do not care for your civilization or your artificial wants, the 
product o- a high civilization. They will not work to accumu- 
late. The Mongolian adventurers or laborers may be more indus- 
trious. They constitute a little over a twentieth part of the whole 
population of the islands. 

Suppose, however, that by some magic you can recreate the 
people of Luzon and give them the wants and cravings of our own 
people and that they will then go to work and produce something 
wherewith to trade with you. What will it be? What can they 
produce that we will want? As the able gentleman from Missis- 
sippi [Mr. Williams] pointed out lately in this House, will not 
the new and augmented productions involve a dangerous competi- 
tion with our own industries by a class of laborers who can live 
well on 10 cents a day while our laborers expect a dollar and up- 
ward? Look at their products. What are they? In the first 
place, there is the product of sugar. There was a time in our 
history when Louisiana produced one-half of the sugar the coun- 
try consumed. 

Now we have the competition of beet sugar — I mean the Ameri- 
can beet-sugar industry. This is a fair rivalry, of which Loui- 
siana does not complain. But you are letting in the coolie and 
slave or contract grown sugar of the Hawaiian Islands duty free, 
and you will soon let in free the pauper-grown sugar of Puerto 
Rico. Your next step is to develop sugar in the Philippines and 
crush out the beet-sugar industry of the Pacific coast and the 
cane sugar of Louisiana. Do j'ou propose to carry the negro la- 
borers of Louisiana to the Philippines after you have starved 
them out? Suppose you develop the growth of tobacco. Will 
that help the tobacco grown in Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, or 
Connecticut? Are the profits of this class, burdened so heavily al- 
ready by your internal-revenue tax, so large that you must needs 
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spend the resources of the whole Union in order to break them 
down by the competition of Malays and Mongolians? 

X. INFLUENCE UPON MARKET FOR COTTON AND OTHER PRODUCTS. 

It has been suggested by some inconsiderate people that we 
could have a profitable market for our cotton in the Philippines. 
It would be far wiser to send our coals to Newcastle. Living in 
a tropical clime, these people have little need for clothing and 
would consume very little cotton; but with industry on their part, 
or, what is more likely, on the part of Chinese and Japanese labor- 
ers, they can, in all probability, produce cotton of the best quality. 
They had produced long-staple cotton until the Spanish Govern- 
ment stepped in and arrested the production. They can resume 
this product and develop it, beyond a doubt. With the Chinese and 
Japanese, if not with native Malay labor, they can manufacture 
this cotton, paying 5 or 10 cents per day for their operatives. 
How would this sort of '"expansion" benefit New England or 
South Carolina or Georgia or other States in which the manu- 
facture of cotton goods is a profitable industry? Is this your 
" white mans burden " that you are so eager to assume? 

I consider, sir, that the argument of the Representative from 
Mississippi [Mr. Williams] is conclusive on this subject, and that 
if the production of these islands is to be stimulated, it will be on 
agricultural lines and will form a competition with home indus- 
tries that are now barely able to maintain themselves under a sys- 
tem of taxation that has little regard for the farmer or the planter. 

There is one other industry in which our people are even more 
likely to suffer. I refer to the hemp-growing industry, a most 
important one in some of our Western States. This industry has 
already been developed in Luzon; and if peace ever comes, then, by 
the aid of Chinese labor, it will be a formidable competitor with 
our own hemp-growing industry. 

XI. TROPICAL TRADE. 

Sir, there is a wide misapprehension in respect to the relative 
value of a tropical trade. In order to estimate it properly, it 
may be well to consider where our exports go. It will be found, 
sir, that they go chiefly to countries lying in temperate regions — 
to races like our own — energetic, intelligent, industrious, and who 
have developed the wants and needs of a high civilization. Now, 
for the calendar year 1898 our total exports were $1,255,546,266; 
for the year 1899, they were $1,275,499,671. I take the latter year. 
Of this last sum we sent to Europe, $959,234,520. We sent to 
France, $70,107,127; to Germany, $161,405,852, and to the Nether- 
lands, $83,601,438. To Great Britain we sent $509,958,335. We 
sent to British North America, $88,284,778. 

Now, compare these exports with our exports to tropical coun- 
tries: To Brazil, with its enormous area and varied production, 
we sent $11,458,997: to all the West Indies, lying right at our door, 
$44,071,055; to Cuba, although at peace, we sent only $24,861,261. 
It may be said that Cuba was still suffering from the war. Then 
turn to Mexico, peaceful , orderly, and progressive. She took from 
us only $29,809,802. It is a very large country, with considerable 
variety of soil and products and with our railroads running 
through the country, but she needed only twenty-nine millions of 
our exports. Mexico is a tropical or semitropical country, and 
her peonle have different wants from our own or from Canada, to 
which we sent some $88,000,000. 

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15 

To the Philippine Islands we exported $69,459 in 1897. That 
was prior to our war with Spain. In 1898 we exported $147,846, 
and last year only $1,663,313, though we had a large army there. 
There is nothing to prove that we can ever expect to have a large 
export trade with the Philippine Islands compared with what we 
may expect with South America, Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, and Central 
America. As compared with our export trade to Europe and our 
prospective exports to China, the possibilities of our export trade 
with the Philippines are absolutely insignificant. But if tropical 
trade is to dominate our imagination and control our policy, it 
wo'ald be far better to see what we can do in the West indies, or 
Mexico, or Central America, or in South America, or tropical 
Africa, instead of wasting our blood and treasure in building up 
customers in Luzon. Our present policy there may lead to some 
large demand for mourning goods, but that wretched people will 
not be able to buy them. 

I repeat it, sir, we should avail ourselves of our great natural ad- 
vantages and pi'oximity to Cuba and the West Indies, to Mexico, 
Central America, and the South American governments. Our 
political relations with Mexico and South America are cordial. 
Practically these governments are. by virtue of the Monroe doc- 
trine, placed under an American protectorate. We say to Europe, 
" Stand off; no land grabbing there. " With such relations, with a 
study of their markets and retiuirements, our people ought to be 
able to absorb much the larger portion of the trade with South 
America, the West Indies, and Mexico. Here is a prize indeed, 
but let it be pursued by the arts of peace. The sword is not needed. 
Let American skill, invention, and genius solve the problem. 
There may perhaps be legislative aids to such trade, which I have 
not now the time to discuss. But I hope that there will be no ef- 
fort by our Government to develop trade with those countries at 
the expense of our own struggling agricultural industries. 

XII. A SUMMARY. 

In the remarks I have submitted I have endeavored to show 
that, starting out with the proposition that war, even when nec- 
essary, is an awful calamity and sacrifice, we have drifted into 
this present war against the people of the Philippines without any 
necessity and occasion for it: that they were our allies in the fight 
with Spain : that they were most friendly and cordial toward the 
Government and people of the United States; that the government 
they set up atMalolos, in the island of Luzon, was organized with- 
out objection from our officers in Luzon or from the Washington 
Administration; that they had every reason to suppose it would 
be recognized; that this government operated for over six months 
all over the island of Luzon save a very few square miles includ- 
ing the city of Manila, and that the attempt to overthrow it and 
substitute therefor a military government of the United States 
Army was an act premature and tending to conflict, and was never 
authorized and approved by Congress, to which body, under our 
Constitution, belonged the settlement of the whole matter. I re- 
call these facts, not with any feeling of acrimony or to impute, 
bad motives to others, but to show that the policy pursued has 
been most unwise and unfortunate. 

At this stage of affairs, after a year of costly war in Luzon, we 
are confronted with the grave questions: Are these islands to be 
permanently heM as a part of our possessions either as a subject 
colony or as an incipetit State or States of the Union? Very few 

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16 

persons, if any, propose the latter scheme at this time, but as there 
are no limits to human folly some will probably urge it in the 
future. The great body of the so-called " expansionists"' propose 
to hold the Philippines as dependencies and to govern them as 
England governs India, Ceylon, and Jamaica— that is, by military 
force — or as France dominates Madagascar. The advocates of this 
plan rest their case chiefly on the commercial argument that this 
"forcible annexation" would promote our trade with China and 
would also give us a valuable trade with these islands themselves. 

1 think that I have shown successfully that there is nothing in 
the so-called commercial argument; that the only trade possible 
with the islands, if it could be developed, would be to stimulate 
dangerous competition with our own agricultural industries by 
the growth of hemp, sugar, tobacco, and cotton; that so far from 
aiding our trade with China the retention of a colony of rebellious 
subjects would, by requiring an army and navy to be kept there, 
embarrass us in the attempt to enforce our rights and interests in 
respect to the great prospective trade of China, and finally, that 
there are large and fertile countries to the southward, such as 
Cuba, Mexico, Central America, Brazil, and others, far more 
worthy of our attention and where trade would be more easily 
secured. 

The commercial argument, therefore, is opposed to all our ex- 
perience and to common sense and is shown to be worthless. It 
has rested on the pure assumption of hasty and ignorant de- 
claimers. Unless this argument can be shown to be perfectly well 
founded, it can not be counted against the cost of the war, the 
evils of a colonial system, the growth of militarism, and the seri- 
ous injury to our form of government — the abandonment of the 
republican idea and the adoption by us of European ideas and 
methods of government. It must also be considered that if we 
are going into the business of land-grabbing and conquest in Asi- 
atic waters, we weaken the position and arguments by which we 
laave heretofore maintained the Monroe doctrine in North and 
South America. The two policies are absolutely contradictory. 
In the one case we forbid conquests and forcible annexation by 
others; in the other case we employ 65,000 soldiers and our Navy 
to work out a conquest over an unwilling people 7,000 miles off, 
who desire independence. We set the example of the very policy 
we object to in European governments. 

XIII. COST OF THE WAR. 

What, sir, is the cost of the war in the Philippines? All the 
orators who favor imperialism seem to shrink from giving us this 
important information. Is it because they do not regard the 
question of fifty or a hundred millions of dollars per annum as 
worthy of consideration by the American taxpayers, or is it because 
they feel that it would be a dangerous branch of the subject for 
them to discuss? We have no estimates from any of them on this 
subject. We are called on to plunge into this new policy without 
considering whether it will or will not increase the public bur- 
dens. I may r6mark right here that the estimates of cost from 
the opponents of imperialism have not been challenged, so far as 
I know. I believe, sir, that the Army of the United States, in 
proportion to its numbers, is more expensive than that of any 
other country. The estimate of cost per man, taking officers and 
men together, is §1,000 per man for a year. As we have 65,000 
men in the Philippines, that alone would mean $65,000,000. 
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But when yon consider that all yonr men, munitions of war, 
food, and other supplies must be transported 7,000 miles from our 
coast, it is apparent that the expense of the war must be fully one 
hundred millions per annum, especially if you include the unu- 
sual expenses for the? Navy. This does not include the prospective 
expense from pensions. Considering the climate and the charac- 
ter of the service, this charge must be very large, even if there 
were to be no further combats or special exposure on the part of 
the troops. Probably no troops have ever had to undergo greater 
hardship and exposure since the days of the French invasion of 
Russia by Napoleon. The estimates of some good judges place 
the cost of this war at SloO.000,000 per annum. One thing is cer- 
tain, the actual cost of war almost always outruns expectations 
or estimates. No one ever dreamed the Spanish war would cost 
as much as it did. 

It may be urged, sir, that the cost of the war and of retaining 
the Philippines will be much less hereafter. A people who have 
held our Army at bay for over a year and are. still fighting us 
will, in any case, require a large army of occupation. Luzon is a 
large island. It is 40,000 square miles, and the country presents 
every facility for insurrectionary operations — more, even, than 
Cuba. It would be necessary to keep up garrisons all over the 
islands and to protect their communications. You would require 
fortifications, not only against the natives, but against all possible 
antagonists. You would need a strong naval force. The expense 
of occupation could not be brought much below a hundred mil- 
lions of dollars. 

XIV. QUI BONO? 

But this is not all. After you have done it all — put do^vn all 
resistance, conciliated the people you are crushing, and caused 
them to love you — have you not given a hostage to fortune? Is 
not Hawaii now at the mercy of any European government with 
whom you may have a war? Would not the Philippines be even 
more exposed? Can you say that you will have no war hereafter 
with any strong power? You have had actual hostilities with 
France in the past, and strained relations with Germany not long 
ago, and with Italy also. With Great Britain you have had two 
long and bloody wars and a number of difficulties leading to the 
very verge of war. You have still unsettled questions with her. 
What is your naval power? We are greatly inferior to France 
and Russia, and are outranked by Great Britain eight or ten to 
one. We are now about equal in sea power to Germany, but if 
the naval programme of the German Government be carried out- 
we will be much inferior to that Government two or three years 
from now. Italy is perhaps not quite equal to us, but a combina- 
tion of Italy and Austria is not unreasonable. If we fought one 
we would have to fight both. Japan will probably be stronger 
than we are on sea two or three years from now. 

Those are not pleasant facts, but they are undeniable. So that 
unless we greatly increase our naval armament our new posses- 
sions will be cut' off from us in case of war. It follows that no 
matter how clear our cause of quarrel, we will be hampered in 
case of war by this new imperial policy. In this connection it is 
well to reflect that two- thirds of our whole Army is now in the 
Philippines. A considerable portion of our Navy is also there. It 
would take much time and expense to bring them home. Is it not 
obvious that while we have by this unfortunate policy multiplied 
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the chances of war with other powers we have really lessened our 
war-making power and diminished our security at home against 
a foreign foe? Instead of protecting our grand home country on 
the Atlantic and the Pacific, we shall have to guard Puerto Rico, 
Hawaii, and the Philippines, or at least so much of the latter as 
we now occupy." There is a very large part of the Philippine 
group, say one-half of the whole, where we have made no attempt 
whatever at occupation. There the savage polygamist roams at 
will — his ov/n sweet will. 

I think, sir, that if we are to pursue the policy on which we 
are entering, a regular army of at least one to two hundred 
thousand men will be required and a navy at least four or five 
times what we now possess. More than that, we will need a 
British or some other alliance to guard against any possible com- 
bination against us. It Would not be enough for us to be strong. 
"W e would have to combine with one or more powers. I need not 
tell you, sir. that such an alliance with England or other coun- 
tries would involve concessions by us and bargains and sacrifices 
that nobody now could foresee. I believe that the advice of 
Washington to avoid " entangling alliances " embodies a sound 
national policy and is yet dear to all patriotic Americans. [Ap- 
plause.] 

I wish to say here that if three years ago any man had pre- 
dicted that the United States Government would send an army 
of 65,000 soldiers across the seas to conquer a people of eight or 
ten millions of another race, with the purpose to hold them as a 
subject colony, he would have been regarded either as a madman 
or a slanderer of the American people and their Government. 

XV. FACE TO FACE WITH MILITARISM. 

We are now brought face to face with militarism. Some twenty 
years ago a great railroad president publicly advocated an army 
of 40,000 men. It was after a great strike of employees. The 
proposition was justly scouted as a monstrous departure from our 
traditional policy of a small standing army. Now we are invited 
to adopt the colonial system of European monarchs and the sys- 
tem of militarism and great armies which has been the curse of 
France, Germany, Austria , Russia, and all the Continent. Even 
England is not free from it. She is now busy sending 150,000 to 
200,000 soldiers manj' thousand miles by sea to conquer two little 
republics in South Africa, and is spending at the rate of three or 
four hundred millions of dollars per year in an unnecessary war. 
It is this system of "militarism " which has driven so many good 
men to this country which we are now called on to imitate in this 
favored land. Sir, I fear that it means much more than foreign 
conquest. It means the subversion of our free institutions, the 
rule of the sword, and the reduction of our workingmen to the 
condition of vassalage exceeding that proposed for the Philippines. 
It means an absolute conquest of labor by the forces of capital. 

XVI. GRAND RESULTS OF LEGITIMATE "EXPANSION." 

An attempt is made to cover up this policy of imperialism and 
militarism by the employment of the mild phrase "expansion." 
Sir, there is no objection from any quarter to legitimate expan- 
sion, such as the expansion of this grand Republic from 1789 up 
to the advent of this unhappy war. It was an expansion in terri- 
tory — contiguous and unsettled territory — expansion in wealth, 
commerce, population, power, science, invention, in all the won- 
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derful arts of peace, by an intelligent, free, and liberty-loving 
population. This expansion has been the wonder and admiration 
of the world. It has lifted us from the position of a feeble Re- 
public with some three millions of people m 1783 to the rank of a 
first-class power, able to face any nation on the earth in a just 
quarrel. Yes. "a world power" — not because we have coveted 
foreign territory all over the world, but because there was no 
power in the world that dared to do us a wrong. A "world 
power " because our political ideas and example had permeated 
the thoughts of meu all over the civilized world, gained for the 
common people a better recognition of their rights, and pointed 
the way to the liberation and advancement of all mankind. A 
nation that could do this by purely moral force was more than a 
world power in modern vulgar acceptation. [Great applause.] 

When was there ever such expansion as ours? We subdued the 
forest and the field; we conquered all obstacles between us and the 
Pacific; we dominated the forces of nature or harnessed them to our 
chariot. We did all this without the sacrifice of our free Consti- 
tution, without wrong or injtistice to other nations, without mak- 
ing a king out of a president or invading the grand sovereign 
power of the American people. 

All honor to this expansion, an expansion not half completed, 
hardly begun, and destined to go on so long as American genius, 
force, and industry shall live under free institutions. But we 
must be careful not to suffer to be substituted for our American 
expansion the cheat, the bastard child of European imperialism. 

XVII. THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE. 

The large territorial acquisitions we have made on this continent 
were all made fairly and honorably. Our first acquisition was 
the great Louisiana purchase by Thomas Jefferson — a vast domain 
sold to us by France and practically unoccupied at the time we 
acquired it. There were in Louisiana — I mean the present limits 
of the State — a few thousand whites who freely accepted our rule, 
and outside there were large areas over which numerous savage 
and nomadic tribes wandered, camped, and fought, without order, 
progress, cities, farms or civilization. The country was contiguous 
to our western borders. It was the natural outlet for our advanc- 
ing settlements, and was capable of being molded into great and 
prosperous States composed of a white and homogeneous popula- 
tion. We introduced no dangerous or incongruous elements into 
our political system. The acquisition of Florida was in like fash- 
ion. Texas was a free and independent State composed mainlj' of 
white people, which sought our political embrace. It has grown 
to be a great Commonwealth. California and New -Mexico were 
occupied by our forces during the Mexican war. They were very 
sparsely settled. They might have lieen claimed and held by us 
as a war indemnity, but we paid Mexico for this territory, and 
now they are settled by a vigorous and enterprising white race of 
our own blood. In all this there was no vulgar greed of con- 
quest. They were contiguous countries, practically unsettled and 
unoccupied, and were capable of being fashioned by immigration 
into homogeneous American communities, as they have been. 

To assert that these honorable, natural, and wise acquisitions 
of territory on our own continent resemble the proposed forcible 
annexation of the inferior races, some 9,000,000 or more, inhab- 
iting the Philippine Islands. 7,000 miles from our western shores 
and densely populated . is to insult the popular intelligence. "What 
alien, hostile, and incongruous nations and organized communities 
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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



010 457 143 8 



20 



did we subjugate in order to acquire Texas, California, Florida, 
and Louisiana? What peoples did we conquer, overrun, and rav- 
a.a,-e in order to deprive them of their government and to substitute 
our own? 

Let it not be forgotten that the Philippine Islands are 7,000 
miles away from our extreme western coast, that their total area 
is only 114.000 square miles, and that they are already more densely 
populated than Ohio or New York by a population who do not 
desire our rule, but are resisting it and sacrificing property and 
life itself to maintain their independence. Is not this policy one 
of imperialism? Will anybody say it is republicanism — the re- 
publicanism of our fathers? In what does it differ from the policy 
of British, German, or French imperialism? How does it differ 
from the British policy in India or in South Africa? We subju- 
gate alien and inferior races many millions in number; we govern 
them by the sword as subjects, and yet we shrink from the little 
word "imperialism." It is not necessary, however, to discuss 
terms or phrases when you once discard liberty, set aside your 
free Constitution, and enthrone a government of force and des- 
potic authority. 

Is it true that empire is the real and final goal and outcome of 
all free republics? Is our old logic false, our Constitution a mis- 
take or out of date, and the immortal Declaration an inconven- 
ient reminiscence — a threadbare garment which fashion and inter- 
est require us now to discard? Is our creed henceforth to be the 
right of the stronger power, not the divine principle of justice? 
The Monroe doctrine, long so hateful to European monarchies — 
is it to be' discarded as mere rubbish? For if the idea of foreign 
conquests and forcible annexations is to prevail, we will certainly 
find it very hard to hold on to the Monroe doctrine. 

XVIII. OUR TRUE GLORY. 

There is another and a better way than all this folly. Our true 
glory, our growth, our freedom consist not in conquest, subject 
colonies, or militarism, but in the paths of liberty, industry, and 
peace. Every great power desires our friendship. Pursuing our 
old methods, what have we to fear from any one of them? What 
need of a great standing army, of war and conscription, or of 
a great absolute government governing colonies by the sword, 
repeating all over the world the cruelties and the wholesale corrup- 
tions which have so often stained the pages of history and f rom 
which it was our proud boast that we were entirely free? 
have reached. I believe, the turning point in our national history:' 
We can stand by the old Constitution and the old ways, or we can 
enter upon the new paths — new to us, but long familiar to the in- 
famous despots of the Old World. The new programme of colo- 
nies and imperialism involves a deadly conflict with the very 
genius of free government and with all the fundamental princi- 
ples of our free institutions. 

The issue is so momentous, so immediate and pressing, that it 
can not be obscured by questions of currency and tariff, however 
important they may be. The issue is before the American people 
to day lor their decision. Heretofore they have not had the op- 
portunity to pass upon it, but they will ere long be heard from, 
and I can not doubt their verdict. It will be, I believe, for lib- 
erty, the Constitution, and the Union, without any admixture of 
imperialism, huge standing armies, militarism, conscriptions and 
wars, or entangling alliances with foreign powers. [Great ap- 
plause on the Democratic side.] 
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